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CLASS ACTIONS

CPLR 901: Class action denied in products liability case where
common questions of design defect and misleading advertisingheld
not to predominate over individual questions of causation and
reliance
Enacted in 1975, article 9 of the CPLR expanded the applicability of the class action device in New York and removed certain
judicially imposed barriers to its use.67 Under CPLR 901, a plenary
Co., 231 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The purpose of allowing ancillary cross-claims is to
expedite the judicial process by determining the rights of all related parties in one action.
See Meisner v. Healey, 18 App. Div. 2d 368, 239 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1st Dep't 1963).
The assertion of an independent cross-claim under CPLR 3019(b) by a person not otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction has been held to constitute a waiver of jurisdictional
defenses. See Goodman v. Solow, 27 App. Div. 2d 920, 279 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't) (mem.),
leave to appeal denied, 20 N.Y.2d 646, 231 N.E.2d 789, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1967). See also
CPLR 320, commentary at 379 (1972 & Supp. 1978-1979). Support for the conclusion that
the assertion of an ancillary cross-claim by a nonresident defendant is ineffective to invoke
jurisdiction under CPLR 303 may be found in the analogous situation where a defendant
asserts a counterclaim that is related to the subject matter of the complaint. The courts have
held that this will not waive a defendant's jurisdictional defenses. See, e.g., Italian Colony
Restaurant, Inc. v. Wershals, 45 App. Div. 2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.)
(dicta); M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 52,
270 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1st Dep't 1966), aff'd mem., 20 N.Y.2d 903, 232 N.E.2d 864, 285 N.Y.S.2d
871 (1967).
TENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1972), in EIGHTEENTH ANN.
REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE A27, A35-36 (1973); see EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL
217, 229-34 (1952). See generally The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 179, 189 (1975). Article 9
'1

of the CPLR replaced the former class action statute, ch. 308, § 1,[1962] N.Y. LAWS (McKinney) (repealed by ch. 207, § 2, [1975] N.Y. LAWS (McKinney)), which required that privity
exist between class members as a condition for maintaining a class action. See D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE § 140, at 176-77 (1978); 2 WK&M T 901.02, at 9-6 to 7; Homburger, State
Class Actions and the FederalRule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1971), reprintedin TENTH ANN.
REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1972), in EIGHTEENTH Am. REP. N.Y. JuD.
CONFERENCE 242, 245-48 (1972). Under this provision, the proposed class action had to be
based on a "legal relation or unity of interest among the individual members of the group in
relation to the subject matter of the action or the right asserted, or, at least a community of
interest in relation to the relief.demanded." EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CoUNCIL 217,

229 (1952) (Civ. PRAC. Acr. § 195 (renumbered CPLR 1005)). The privity requirement was
included to avoid situations in which non-participating class members would be bound by
a judgment in the absence of a common tie. See Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276
N.Y. 230, 236-37, 11 N.E.2d 890, 893 (1937); Homburger, supra, at 613-17. Thus, the courts
frequently held that "[sleparate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by similar
means and even pursuant to a single plan, do not alone create a common or general interest

in those who are wronged." Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 400, 259 N.E.2d 720, 721,
311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (1970) (quoting Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of
Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1939); see Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d
524, 300 N.E.2d 388, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973). The strict construction of the former class

action statute limited its utility to situations involving a common fund or legal relationship
arising from "trusts, partnership, or joint ventures, and ownership of corporate stock."
TENTH ANN. REP. OF Tm JUm. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1972), in EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP.
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class action may be maintained by a representative plaintiff on
behalf of a defined class if certain statutory prerequisites are satisfied." In addition, where particular common issues can be isolated,
CPLR 906 allows the court to treat the case as a partial class action." Since the enactment of the revised class action statute, howN.Y. Jun. CONFERENCE A26, A36 (1973); see Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 402, 259
N.E.2d 720, 722, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1970). Moreover, the courts tended to allow class
actions only where the relief sought was injunctive or declaratory or where a common fund
was involved. See, e.g., Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287
(1938); Onofrio v. Playboy Club, 20 App. Div. 2d 3, 6-8, 244 N.Y.S.2d 485, 488-90 (1st Dep't)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), rev'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308, 257 N.Y.S.2d 171
(1965). Such restrictive and inconsistent interpretations contributed to the deterioration
of the law of class actions in New York into a "chaotic and incomprehensible state." CPLR
901, commentary at 322 (McKinney 1976). Although by 1974 the Court of Appeals had
undertaken a judicial expansion of the class action device, it expressed a preference for legislative revision of the statute. Ray v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 35 N.Y.2d 147, 156, 316
N.E.2d 320, 325, 359 N.Y.S.2d 28, 35 (1974) (Wachtler, J., concurring); see Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304, 313, 307 N.E.2d 554, 558, 352 N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1973);
D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 139, at 174 (1978).
Ultimately, the legislature enacted article 9 in an effort to expand the availability of the
class action device and render it more flexible. See TENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE
ON THE CPLR (1972), in SEVENTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE 215, 217-19 (1972); 2
WK&M
901.01-.02. Under the new statutory scheme, the privity requirement was eliminated in favor of the familiar requirement that common questions of law or fact
"predominate" over individual questions. CPLR 901; see note 68 infra. With the adoption of
article 9, New York's class action statute now parallels the federal statutory scheme governing
class actions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; 2 WK&M
901.03, .08. See generally Homburger, The
1975 New York JudicialConferencePackage: ClassActions and Comparative Negligence. 25
BUFFALO L. REv. 415, 415-30 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Conference Package].
S CPLR 901(a) provides:
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise
required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class;
4. the representative will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
11CPLR 906(1) (1976). In determining whether partial class treatment under CPLR 906
is appropriate, the court must evaluate the suit in light of the criteria delineated in CPLR
901. See 2 WK&M 906.04, at 9-118. In addition, the court may deny partial class status if,
after considering the factors enunciated in CPLR 902 (1976), it finds that the class suit would
not serve the best interests of all concerned parties. Among the factors to be weighed are:
1. The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions;
2. The impracticability or inefficiency of prosecuting or defending actions.
3. The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class;
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ever, the availability of these provisions in mass tort litigation has
remained uncertain. 0 Recently, in Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co.,7
the Appellate Division, Second Department, adopted a narrow view
of article 9, holding that a class action is not a suitable method for
adjudicating mass products liability claims since the common questions of design defect and misleading advertising did not predominate over 2individual questions of causation, reliance and affirmative
7
defenses.
In Rosenfeld, the plaintiff instituted a products liability suit
against the manufacturer of a contraceptive device (IUD) ,7 seeking
to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from its use. 71 In
4. The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claim in
the particular forum;
5. The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
CPLR 902 (1976); see D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 142, at 181-82 (1978).
70The legislative history of article 9 of the CPLR does not indicate whether the new class

action device was intended to be utilized in mass tort cases. See TENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD.
CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1972), in EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE A27, A35
(1973). Proponents of the measure, however, noted that "class actions are useful in a wide
variety of legal contexts, including. . . mass torts." Memorandum of the State Consumer
Protection Bd. to Counsel to the Governor, May 29, 1975 (emphasis added); see Governor's
Message on Approval of ch. 207, reprinted in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1748 (McKinney); D. SIEGEL,
NEw YORK PRACTICE § 142, at 182-83 (1978); 2 WK&M 901.02, at 9-7. But see CPLR 901,
would be an
commentary at 21 (Supp. 1978-1979). Dean McLaughlin has stated that "[ijt
unusual 'mass accident' case that would qualify for class action treatment, although it would
not be amiss to consider isolating the liability issue for such treatment." CPLR 901, commentary at 327 (1976); see CPLR 906, commentary at 345 (1976). Moreover, Professor Siegel
considers article 9 "uniquely appropriate" for litigating mass torts arising from a common
disaster. D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 142, at 183 (1978); see 2 WK&M T]906.02, at 9116. But see Kanon v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical Center, 87 Misc. 2d 816, 386 N.Y.S.2d 274
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975). See also 2 WK&M 901.08, at 8-30 to 34.
71 63 App. Div. 2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dep't 1978).
72 Id. at 20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
"The device, known as the "Dalkon Shield," originally was tested and marketed by its
inventor, Dalkon Corporation, in 1969. The defendant, A.H. Robins, Co., Inc., acquired all
rights to the Dalkon Shield on June 12, 1970 and simultaneously commenced marketing and
testing. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litigation, 406 F.
Supp. 540, 540-41 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (per curiam). Between 1970 and 1974, the device had been
sold to approximately 2.2 million women. 63 App. Div. 2d at 13, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The
device could be obtained only through a licensed physician, whose responsibility it was to
explain the relative advantages and disadvantages of the device before inserting it. Id. at 22,
407 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). The defendant had advertised the Dalkon
Shield in various medical journals and product literature issued to the prospective user
through her physician. Id. at 13, 18, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 197, 200.
7' 63 App. Div. 2d at 13, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The plaintiff in Rosenfeld had the Dalkon
Shield fitted and inserted by her physician in September 1972. In March 1975, she was hospitalized for uterine complications allegedly resulting from the IUD. As a result of her injuries, she was required to undergo a hysterectomy one month later. Id. at 22, 407 N.Y.S.2d at
203 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). After an FDA investigation and several medical reports revealed
that the device was "unsafe and ineffective," the defendant voluntarily and permanently
discontinued the distribution of the product in January 1975. Id. at 13, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
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her complaint, the plaintiff alleged defective product design and
breach of express and implied warranties of fitness for use.75 Proposing to represent approximately 2,525 prospective suitors, ' 6 the plaintiff moved under CPLR 902 for an order permitting her to maintain
the action on behalf of all "New York women who suffered 'pelvic
infection, uterine abscessing and/or perforation, and related or inci77
dental hemorrhaging' as a consequence of the use of the [IUD].
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, denied the application for
class action status, finding that the potential for the class action to
degenerate into "multiple fact trials within the framework of the
primary. . . action" militated against the conclusion that common
questions predominated over individual questions of law and fact. 8
The appellate division affirmed. Justice Gulotta,7' writing for
a divided panel, stated that, unlike a case involving a single-disaster
mass tort, a products liability suit with inherently complex questions of fact is not conducive to a class-wide determination. While
issues of defective design and falsity of the representations might be
proper subjects for class treatment, 8' the court observed that the
Id. at 12, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 196-97.
7' The parties agreed that 2,525 was an accurate estimate of the size of the proposed
plaintiff class. Id. at 23, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). At the time of the
Rosenfeld suit, 670 product liability suits involving the Dalkon Shield had been commenced
nationwide. Id. at 13, 407 N.Y.S. 2d at 197. Seventy-two actions were brought in New York
with 55 still pending. Id. at 23, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 12-13, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The class was limited to those New York women
who, as patients of gynecologists in New York, had the Dalkon Shield implanted during the
period between June 12, 1970 and June 28, 1974. Id. at 22-23, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (Shapiro,
J., dissenting).
78Id. at 26, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 205 (Shapiro, J., dissenting) (quoting Special Term
Sup. Ct. Nassau County (Burstein, J.)). In view of the large number of pending actions
involving the Dalkon Shield and the numerous parties who would have to be joined as defendants, the lower court found the class suit not to be the superior method of adjudication.
Id.; see CPLR 902 (1976).
71Presiding Justice Titone and Justice Cohalan joined Justice Gulotta in the majority
opinion. Justice Shapiro dissented in a separate opinion.
50 63 App. Div. 2d at 20, 407 N.Y.S. 2d at 201.
In drafting Rule 23, the federal class action statute, the advisory committee noted that
7

the class device is particularly unsuited for mass accident litigation. The advisory committee
assumed that individual questions of damages, liability and defenses to liability "would
degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried." Advisory Committee's Note
to Proposed Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1966); see
3A L. FRUMER & M. FIuMA § 46A.02 [4] (1978). But see Hemandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 560 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (class action available in mass disaster litigation
where causation and negligence subject to clear-cut determination), aff'd mem., 507 F.2d
1278 (5th Cir. 1975); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45 [3], at 23-811 (2d ed. 1978); 7A
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1783, at 116-18 (1970). Noting
that the New York class action statute is modeled on its federal counterpart, see TWENTYFIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun. CONFERENCE 192-94 (1976); D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 141,
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concomitant questions of causation, reliance and affirmative defenses as to each class member would have to be resolved on an individual basis.82 Justice Gulotta noted that a determination that the IUD
had been defectively designed would not permit an inference of
causation since the close relationship between the alleged design
defects and an individual's injury would require further factual inquiry. 3 Moreover, Justice Gulotta reasoned, because the purportedly misleading advertisements were made to the physicians rather
than directly to the members of the proposed class, a ruling on the
breach of warranty question would leave for adjudication the further
at 178 (1978), the Rosenfeld court nevertheless concluded that New York courts are not bound
by the restrictive federal view of the use of the class action device in mass disaster suits. In
an appropriate case, the Rosenfeld court stated, a single mass tort might form the basis of a
class action under CPLR 901. 63 App. Div. 2d at 16, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199.

But see Vincent Petrosino Seafood Corp. v. Consolidated Edison, Inc., 97 Misc. 2d 110,
410 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). The Vincent Petrosino court denied class
treatment in a suit for damages resulting from a mass utility power failure in the New York
metropolitan area. The plaintiffs representative alleged breach of the power company's warranty to provide continuous service, and negligent failure to "shed load" and thereby avoid
a major blackout. In denying class status, the court reasoned that the common questions did
not predominate over individual fact questions such as reliance and the form and dates of
the warranties. 97 Misc. 2d 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d 747.
1163 App. Div. 2d at 16, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199. The court observed that, in addition to
raising the statute of limitations and contributory negligence as affirmative defenses, the
Rosenfeld defendant could argue that the individual plaintiffs' physicians caused the injury
by inserting the device improperly or providing inadequate instructions regarding its use. Id.
at 16-17 & n.2, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199 & n.2. It should be noted, however, that, in a proper case,
the court's authority under CPLR 906(2) to divide a class into subclasses and treat each
subclass as a class could be used to create subclasses to correspond with any statute of
limitation questions. The plenary class action would then be held in abeyance until the
subclass issues were resolved.
63 App. Div. 2d at 17, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200. The Rosenfeld court observed that a
variety of intervening variables, including a patient's peculiar physical characteristics, could
have been the proximate cause of the personal injuries. Id.; see Kanon v. Brookdale Hosp.
Medical Center, 87 Misc. 2d 816, 386 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975). Justice
Gulotta cited Vincent v. Thompson, 50 App. Div. 2d 211, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1975),
as an illustration of the difficulties inherent in establishing causation in cases involving
defective pharmaceutical products. 63 App. Div. 2d at 17, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 179. Despite a prior
ruling that a vaccine manufactured by the defendant was dangerously defective, Tinnerholm
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969), the Vincent court held that the defendant
was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of defectiveness. Since the Vincent
plaintiffs injuries could have been caused by a different component of the vaccine than the
component which caused the injuries in the earlier federal suit, the Vincent court found that
the underlying issues were not identical and, consequently, the collateral estoppel doctrine
could not be invoked. 50 App. Div. 2d at 218-19, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 126. See generally Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel in New York, 44 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 165, 182-95 (1965). The difficulties confronting the Vincent plaintiff were also present in Rosenfeld; in both cases, different
features of the product in question were associated with different types of injuries. Compare
50 App. Div. 2d at 219, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 126-27, with 63 App. Div. 2d at 24, 407 N.Y.S.2d at
204 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
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issue of individual reliance. 84 Finally, the court refused to permit
even partial class treatment for the common issues of defective design and misleading advertising under CPLR 906.s Noting that a
separate trial of these narrow issues would not produce substantial
savings of time or expense for either the litigants or the courts,88
Justice Gulotta concluded the common issues were so "thoroughly
intertwined" with the individual questions as to preclude a partial
87
class action.
" 63 App. Div. 2d at 18, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 200; see Ross v. Amrep Corp., 57 App. Div. 2d
99, 393 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1st Dep't 1977); Viders v. Pennsylvania Handicapped Workers, Inc.,
90 Misc. 2d 579, 395 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1977). But see Guadagno v.
Diamond Tours & Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 392 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1976). The court noted that additional difficulties were presented by "the fact that different
types of advertisements were printed at various times in various [medical] journals." 63
App. Div. 2d at 18, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
63 App. Div. 2d at 20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
' Id. The court noted that many of the potential class members already were participating in the joint discovery procedures that had been instituted in the federal Dalkon Shield
litigation. Id. Under a voluntary agreement among attorneys, the Dalkon Shield plaintiffs
could obtain a group discovery package, including master interrogatories, documentation and
depositions, in return for a fee based on a proportionate share of the cost. Id. at 20-21 n.3,
407 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02 n.3; see Rheingold, The Mer/29 Story-An Instance of Successful
Mass DisasterLitigation, 56 CAL.L. REV. 116 (1968). See also Goldblatt v. William S. Merrell
Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 886, 254 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam). The court further
stated that those plaintiffs who did not participate in the group discovery might rely on the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of certain common issues. 63 App. Div.
2d at 20-21, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 202. This suggestion, however, appears somewhat questionable
in light of the Rosenfeld court's analogy between the issues before it and those presented in
Vincent v. Thompson, 50 App. Div. 2d 211, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1975), in which the
plaintiff's attempt to invoke collateral estoppel was rejected. See note 83 supra. See also
Weinstein, Revision of Procedure:Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433,
448-49 (1960).
" 63 App. Div. 2d at 20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201. The Rosenfeld court relied heavily on the
reasoning in a prior second department decision, Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 60 App.
Div. 2d 501, 401 N.Y.S.2d 233 (2d Dep't 1978). The plaintiffs in Straussbrought a class action
seeking to rescind their purchases of season tickets for the New York Nets basketball team
games. The proposed class included all purchasers who relied on advertisements promising
that a star player, Julius Erving, would be playing the oncoming season. Erving had been
traded, however, prior to the season's start. The court held that individual questions of
reliance on the advertising predominated and, despite the severable class issue of misrepresentation, no substantial benefit would be conferred by granting partial class treatment. Id.
at 503, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 235; see Vincent Petrosino Seafood Corp. v. Consolidated Edison
Inc., 97 Misc. 2d 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). It should be noted,
however, that the Strauss holding was based in part on its finding that the limited number
of pending lawsuits indicated a "paucity of litigants" in the proposed plaintiff class. 60 App.
Div. 2d at 506, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 238; see CPLR 901(a)(1). But see Guadagno v. Diamond
Tours & Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 392 N.Y.S. 2d 783 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976). The
use of the Strauss reasoning in Rosenfeld, in which there were approximately 2,500 potential
plaintiffs, suggests that the court will be reluctant in the future to afford partial class treatment in all cases where "'common exposure to - or reliance upon - alleged misleading
advertisements cannot be readily inferred. . . ."' 63 App. Div. 2d at 19, 407 N.Y.S.2d at
220 (quoting Comment, Litigating the Antitrust Conspiracy Under Amended Rule 23, 54
VA. L. REV. 314, 318 (1968).
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Shapiro argued that the common questions of defective design and misleading advertising
should be afforded partial class treatment under CPLR 906.' He
contended that since the legislature did not demonstrate an intention to foreclose partial class treatment in products liability cases,
the court should not limit the utility of the new class action statute
by superimposing such a restriction. 8 Noting that the majority conceded the potential applicability of the class device to a single mass
disaster, the dissent emphasized that the need for class relief is even
more compelling in the case of a products liability action, where the
high cost of litigation might deter individuals from bringing suit.90
Justice Shapiro concluded that where mass litigation and its accompanying expenses can be avoided or reduced through the vehicle of
a single class action, the court should invoke its power under article
9 of the CPLR to sever common issues for class treatment.'
Notwithstanding the liberal remedial purposes underlying the
enactment of article 9,92 the Rosenfeld court's restrictive construction of CPLR 901 seems justifiable in a products liability suit where
the common issues of design defect and product misrepresentation
may not predominate over individual questions of causation and
reliance. Even partial class treatment of the design defect issue
under CPLR 906 appears inappropriate since this question could not
be resolved without reference to the individual injuries caused by
the defective product design. 3 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the
Rosenfeld court extended this reasoning too far in refusing to sever
63 App. Div. 2d at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
"Id.
10Id. at 33-34, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
9, Id. at 32, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (Shapiro, J., dissenting); see D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE § 141, at 180 (1978). See generally 2 WK&M
601.01, 602.02, 602.17, 603.07,
1002.05.
92 The legislative objective underlying the enactment of article 9 was to "infuse the
pertinent law with practical flexibility, so that it may accomodate a pressing need for an
effective, but controlled group remedy in situations where neither actual joinder of a numerous class nor the maintenance of individual actions is practicable . . . ." TENTH ANN. REP.
OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1972), in EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun.
CONFERENcE A27, A35 (1973); see Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 207, N.Y.
Laws, reprinted in [1975] N.Y. LAWS 1748 (McKinney). See also TwENTIETH ANN. REP. N.Y.
JUD. CONFERENCE 206-10 (1975); 1975 Conference Package, supra note 67, at 415-30.
"1 It is evident that, in the case of a products liability suit involving pharmaceuticals or
medical devices, a determination of defective design may not be possible without inquiry into
the causal connection to the alleged injuries. See Vincent v. Thompson, 50 App. Div. 2d 211,
377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1975). Moreover, in cases such as Rosenfeld, where more than
one design defect is alleged to have caused a variety of injuries to members of the proposed
plaintiff class, see 63 App. Div. 2d at 24, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 204 (Shapiro, J., dissenting), a
single common issue of defective design is not presented.
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the common fact question of misleading advertising for class-wide
determination. In limiting the availability of CPLR 906, the
Rosenfeld court apparently assumed that a partial class action may
not be maintained unless the entire issue of the defendant's liability
is capable of being resolved on a class-wide basis.9 4 This assumption,
however, appears untenable in light of the express statutory provision for severing specific issues for class treatment where such treatment is feasible and would promote judicial economy. Indeed, the
court's authorit under CPLR 906 to isolate an issue for class-wide
determination would seem to obviate the need for the court to inquire into whether common questions predominate over individual
questions. 5
It is hoped that the Court of Appeals will take the earliest
opportunity to consider the issues presented in Rosenfeld and establish clear guidelines for the application of article 9 consistent 'with
the underlying remedial legislative intent. Cases involving misleading advertising seem particularly amenable to adjudication under
CPLR 906. Moreover, while the design defect at issue in Rosenfeld
was not conducive to class-wide determination, an extension of the
Rosenfeld reasoning to foreclose use of the class action device in all
products liability cases would seem premature. In some instances,
most notably cases involving mechanical failures, the defective
product design can be established without reference to the individual injuries it caused. In such cases, it is suggested, partial class
treatment is feasible and appropriate, since the "sophisticated
proof' required to sustain complex factual bases may be beyond the
financial resources of the individual plaintiff.
William J. Cople III
" 63 App. Div. 2d at 18-19, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 200; see Kindel v. Kaufman and Broad
Homes, Inc., 413 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1979) (per curiam); Strauss v. Long Island Sports,
Inc., 60 App. Div. 2d 501, 503,401 N.Y.S.2d 233,235 (2d Dep't 1978). But see Vickers v. Home
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 62 App. Div. 2d 1171, 404 N.Y.S.2d 201 (4th Dep't 1978); Guadagno v. Diamond Tours & Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 392 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1976).
"See CPLR 906; 2 WK&M 906.04, at 9-118.
" 63 App. Div. 2d at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). The class action
device allows the class members to seek relief where "insurmountable" litigation expenses
might otherwise deter the individual from bringing suit and permit the tortfeasor to benefit
from the enormity of his tort. D. SIEmE, N.w YoRK PRAnc. § 139, at 173 (1978). One
commentator has noted that "even for a single badly injured plaintiff, the preparation of a
complex products liability. . . case is an extremely expensive undertaking." Rabin, Dealing
With Disasters:Some Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal System, 30 STAN. L. Rav. 281,
295 (1978); see 63 App. Div. 2d at 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 207 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). But see
id. at 20-21 n.3, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201 n.3.

